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Introduction 
"International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is not meant to legitimize warfare, or to imply that any 
military action not specifically prohibited under the existing law is legitimate. Rather, International 
Humanitarian Law should be seen as the legal expression of an effort to reduce as far as possible 
the suffering inflicted in armed conflicts."[1]  
The issue of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) has been discussed for several years and 
discussions have included the question of whether existing legal regimes are sufficient to deal 
with this problem. Following the negotiations for a new legally binding instrument on ERW within 
the CCW,[2] some delegations have argued that present principles of IHL are sufficient and need 
not to be further developed in the ERW context while others claim that the law does need further 
developments.[3] 
However the discussions about the adequacy of IHL end, as long as there is no political will to 
comprehensively deal with the ERW issue, there will be no future solution that reduces the 
imminent threat caused by ERW on the ground. 
General Legal Context 
It is not possible to refer to a single legal regime applicable to ERW under existing international 
law.[4] However, International Humanitarian Law—the body of international law which governs 
the conduct of armed conflict—lays down general norms which have to be taken into 
consideration when exploring legal complexities of the ERW problem. 
IHL adheres to the principle that the parties in an armed conflict have not the unlimited right to 
choose the means and methods of warfare. In particular, it is prohibited to employ means or 
methods which are intended or are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering.[5] Therefore every High Contracting Party to Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions has the obligation to determine whether these means and methods are compatible 
with the rules of international law.[6] 
One of the main principles regarding the legal aspects of ERW is the prohibition of indiscriminate 
attacks,[7] which will be discussed below. 
As outlined in Part I of this Strategic Insight, the ERW problem is mainly caused by certain 
munitions that failed to function. To comprehensively deal with legal issues, it is necessary to 
focus on the munitions concerned before they become ERW. This raises questions concerning 
the design and the use of these ordnance. 
Design 
During the negotiations in Geneva, several States Parties to the CCW proposed to introduce 
regulations which would make munitions more reliable.[8] The proposed technically improved 
ammunition is designed in a way that it detonates on impact or automatically explodes shortly 
thereafter, thus reducing substantially the ERW problem. The enhanced reliability of munitions 
would be desirable from a military as well as a humanitarian point of view.[9] 
Although Article 36 of Additional Protocol I obliges states to determine whether the development 
of new weapons corresponds with the rules of international law, states are not obliged to replace 
their existing stocks with new and more reliable weapons.[10] 
Consequently, it would be of great practical utility to have a new regulation which would cover 
preventive technical measures. This would lead to a direct reduction of the threat caused by 
these types of ammunition. 
Use 
Because of the imprecision of munitions that cause the ERW problem, (i.e. effects on civilian 
populations rather than objectives), some stated that the use of such weapons may be of an 
indiscriminate nature making them illegal.[11] 
The basic principles regarding targeting are the following[12] : Civilians and civilian objects are 
not lawful targets; indiscriminate attacks are prohibited; and whenever a military objective is 
attacked, it must comply with the principle of proportionality.[13] 
There is no doubt that any weapon could be used in a manner contrary to the above mentioned 
principles, irrespective of ERW reflections. However, the question is whether the risk of certain 
ammunition malfunctioning and thus posing a direct threat to the civil population could render the 
attack indiscriminate or disproportionate. 
Article 51, para 4 of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits attacks which are of an 
indiscriminate manner. Indiscriminate attacks are: 
• those which are not directed at a specific military objective  
• those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective  
• those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be limited as required 
by this Protocol  
The fact that munitions fail to function and therefore cause a threat to the civilian population (with 
the prerequisite that the attack was targeted against a military objective— otherwise the attack 
would be in violation of Article 51 anyway, without taking into account of the effects of ERW) does 
not mean that the use of these munitions is indiscriminate and therefore in violation of Article 51 
para 4 of the Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. No rule in IHL requires a limitation on 
the effect of a weapon as a mean for protecting civilian populations.[14] 
What is required is that the expected casualties of the attack should not be in a disproportionate 
balance to the military advantage.[15] What has to be considered is whether an attack with 
munitions that do not function as intended endanger the civil population, and thus could be seen 
as a violation of the principle of proportionality.[16] However, long-term post-conflict threats like 
the one caused by ERW are difficult to assess during the attack. The proportionality of an attack 
has to be taken into account at the time of the attack on the basis of reliable information available 
to the military commander. How many ordnance may fail to function cannot be a consideration for 
a commander in a time of war, and furthermore cannot be definitively answered by the 
commander. What has to be considered is the possibility of alternatives to those weapons which 
have a high risk of causing ERW . However, as long as there are no real alternatives to the 
weapons a military commander has, the use of these types of munitions seems not to violate 
current IHL rules. This question has to be elaborated separately in more detail, and would go 
beyond the scope of this paper .  
A New ERW Legally Binding Instrument 
At the CCW Review Conference in December 2001, States Parties decided to elaborate on the 
question of ERW with the aim of possibly creating a new legally binding instrument.[19] At the last 
Meeting of States Parties in December 2002, it was decided to continue the work on ERW with a 
negotiating mandate that covers mainly post-conflict, but not preventive measures.[20] 
Specifically, questions on the responsibility for clearance, the provision of information to facilitate 
clearance and risk education, warnings to civilian populations, assistance and cooperation as well 
as a framework for regular consultations of High Contracting Parties will be discussed. The 
implementation of the full range of the proposed measures could lead to an important new 
regulation on ERW. However, these measures do not directly reduce the number of ERW, neither 
during a conflict and nor during the post-conflict period. As long as clearance organizations won't 
be in the field, a possible new instrument based on the above mentioned measures will not have 
any direct impact on the ground. In addition, it is more highly doubtful that all proposed measures 
will be in the final instrument.[21] The first round of negotiations in Geneva has already shown 
that some States do not see the necessity of a legally binding instrument.[22] 
Thus, one has to raise the question of whether the agreed upon approach among States Parties 
to the CCW is a promising one. There are three main elements which have to be taken into 
account when trying to reduce the danger caused by ERW within a new protocol of the CCW: 
• Spirit of the Convention  
• How to effectively reduce the amount of ERW 
• Supporting measures  
Spirit of the Convention 
The CCW is a Convention which prohibits or restricts the use of certain conventional weapons, 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.[23] As a 
weapons convention, it deals directly with specific, individual weapons themselves. For example, 
Protocol II, the Mine Protocol, which was amended in 1996, prohibits the use of anti-personnel 
mines which are not detectable[24] and restricts the use of remotely-delivered mines.[25] The 
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons prohibits the use of laser weapons specifically designed to 
cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.[26] The fact that this convention has a direct 
impact on the battlefield directly reduces the danger caused by certain types of weapons and 
makes the CCW essential for the protection of soldiers and civilians. Any renunciation of this 
principle would lead to a lack of efficiency and thus, to a lack of credibility. 
It is of great importance that the negotiators keep in mind that it took more than a decade to build 
confidence in this convention. Abandoning this promising and effective track would be 
irresponsible and could directly undermine the well-being of both soldiers and civilians in and 
after a conflict. 
How to Effectively Reduce the Amount of ERW 
As outlined above, today's ERW problem is primarily a result of mass produced and massively 
used ammunition, such as sub-munitions from cluster bombs, artillery shells or mortars equipped 
with a simple fusing system. The malfunction of these explosives causes the ERW threat. By 
focusing on the reliability[27]—equipping the munitions concerned with a back-up feature—a 
great number of duds could be substantially and directly reduced before they become ERW. That 
would lead to a direct positive impact on the ground and, in addition, would also increase military 
value.[28] A great number of ERW is desirable from neither a humanitarian nor a military point of 
view. 
During the last three years several States presented discussion papers to the CCW 
Governmental Group of Experts on how to effectively reduce the great number of duds.[29] 
Figures from the field have shown that in some cases, the calculated number of duds raises up to 
almost 30%.[30] Specifically, cluster bomb ammunitions have raised great concerns. 
The main reasons why some munitions do not function as intended are as follows[31]: 
• use of a simple fusing system  
• no back-up system 
• low quality products 
• unclear conditions of use 
• characteristics of terrain of impact  
To balance this negative result, munitions concerned should be equipped with a technically 
improved fusing system.[32] Tests by several armed forces where modern types of munitions 
have been used in combat or in test sites show that a substantial increase in reliability can be 
achieved by equipping munitions with a back-up system. The Swiss armed forces use cluster 
ammunition with a self-destruction mechanism that reduces the number of duds to fewer than 
2%.[33] The U.S. Armed Services are directed to design and procure future sub-munitions with a 
99% or higher "functioning rate"[34] by 2005.[35] 
These figures show that modern technology is available to immediately reduce the great amount 
of unexploded ordnance, thus effectively reducing the direct humanitarian danger. The CCW 
Meeting of States Parties has decided to focus only on post-conflict measures which would not 
have a direct effect right after the conflict, and thus could render the post-conflict efforts 
inefficient.[36] 
By implementing preventive technical measures to a new instrument, the post-conflict threat 
caused by unexploded munitions could be extensively reduced. It would simplify any post-conflict 
effort especially in regard of the protection of peace-keeping operations and civilian populations. 
Some delegations raised concerns about the costs of introducing new fusing systems. In fact, the 
production of modern types of cluster munitions with a back-up system increases the costs per 
shell by 10 to 15%.[37] However, a simplistic cost calculation barely based on the financial 
implications for buying a new ammunition system can lead to a distorted picture. Several other 
factors, such as the additional military value, reduction of costs for clearance as well as the 
decrease of negative social and economic implications need to be taken into account so that an 
overall picture of all additional costs and savings can be clearly and objectively estimated.[38] 
Supporting Measures 
Any restrictions on the use of certain types of weapons need to have a framework within which 
important supporting measures are regulated. For example, the amended Protocol II to the CCW 
calls for clear restrictions on the use of mines and, in addition, covers additional elements for a 
sustainable post-conflict solution to the mine problem.[39] 
There are several questions which have to be raised regarding supporting measures. First there 
is the question of responsibility for clearance after the war (is it the responsibility of the country 
which used the weapons, the country which has jurisdiction over the affected landscape, or within 
the responsibility of the aggressor?). Second, there are questions regarding information 
exchange (what information is needed to successfully clear ERW affected areas, and is such 
information confidential?). Third, regarding a verification mechanism, what kind of mechanism 
would be appropriate for technical as well as post-conflict measures? 
The assessment of which supporting measures are necessary and relevant for a comprehensive 
solution clearly requires a careful examination. However, to achieve a comprehensive and 
practical solution with a long-lasting positive impact on the ground, there has to be a package of 
preventive technical measures directly affecting the weapons concerned combined with post-
conflict remedial regulations. 
Conclusions 
After almost three years of discussions and negotiations, there is still a lack of a common 
understanding on how to deal with the ERW problem. Although it was decided to negotiate a 
legally binding ERW instrument on post-conflict remedial measures, first reactions on the 
coordinator's paper[40] have shown that on the one hand, the framework paper is possibly too 
unwieldy and could take years to negotiate and, on the other hand, the proposed way forward is 
not comprehensive enough to deal directly with the problem, (meaning that the approach—as 
pointed out above—is incomplete). In addition, although it was agreed to negotiate a legally 
binding instrument, some delegations do not give the impression that they are willing to be bound 
on that agreement. 
Figures from the field show that ERW pose an imminent threat. There is not much time for 
negotiators to agree to a new instrument to effectively reduce that threat. However, a partial 
solution—by implementing only post-conflict remedial measures—cannot be a good solution 
because of the already existing necessity to reopen negotiations. It would result in an 
unnecessary lack of confidence in the new instrument. 
So far, what has happened in Geneva on the issue of ERW are negotiations for negotiation's 
sake, without the clear political will to solve the problem caused by ERW. Technical solutions to 
improve weapons' reliability are available and would have a direct positive impact in the field—in 
contrast to post-conflict measures. They would be in the interest of humanitarian organizations as 
well as the military. By following the approach proposed by the coordinator, the CCW community 
would not only jeopardize any success of a new ERW instrument in the field but it would also risk 
being confronted with demands by the public and non-governmental organizations (such as a ban 
on certain types of munitions), that militaries cannot accept. 
There is still time to substantially complement the negotiating mandate in the outlined way. 
However, as long as there is no political will to comprehensively and honestly deal with the ERW 
problem, a realistic and useful field solution will not be achievable. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our WMD Resources 
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